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Introduction
Few security issues have captured the attention of the public as has the
specter of cyberwar. In a recent op-ed, President Obama warns that the “cyber
threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security
challenges we face.”1 This, in turn, has raised many questions about the legal
parameters of cyber operations, to include the rules applicable to actual
cyberwar.2
Parallel to the growing interest in the legal aspects of cyberwar, are an
increasing number of questions focused on the ethical dimension. That is an
important consideration for any military endeavor but one just emerging with
respect to cyber operations.3 Mounting concern about the ethical aspects of
cyber activities led to an entire conference on the subject being sponsored by
the U.S. Naval Academy in the spring of 2012.4 Even more recently, an article
appeared in The Atlantic magazine entitled Is it Possible to Wage a Just
Cyberwar? Which discussed several intriguing issues5
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The purpose of this short essay is to reflect upon a few issues that illustrate
how legal and ethical issues intersect in the cyber realm. Such an intersection
should not be especially surprising., Historian Geoffrey Best insists, “[I]t must
never be forgotten that the law of war, wherever it began at all, began mainly as
a matter of religion and ethics . . . “It began in ethics” Best says “and it has
kept one foot in ethics ever since.”6 Understanding that relationship is vital to
appreciating the full scope of the responsibilities of a cyber-warrior in the 21st
century.
Law and Ethics
How do law and ethics relate? Certainly adherence to the law is a baseline
ethical responsibility, but it is only that: a baseline. In the March 2012 edition
of Armed Forces Journal7 US Navy Lieutenant Gabriel Bradley points out that
“The law of armed conflict sets minimum standards” and he goes on to argue
persuasively that inculcating individual and institutional moral and ethical
values – a sense of honor if you will - is essential to ensuring actual compliance
with the law.8 And he is certainly right when he quotes Christopher Coker’s
observation that “laws can reaffirm the warrior ethos; they cannot replace it.” 9
Of course, even determining the baseline – that is, the law - is not always easy
in 21st century operations generally, but especially with regard to cyber
activities. Among the many reasons for this is that fact that most of the law of
armed conflict (LOAC) was designed to address conflicts waged mainly with
kinetic weaponry. Nevertheless, in this writer’s view, existing law has ready
applicability to cyber operations. This perhaps brings us to the first issue
regarding the intersection of law, ethics, and cyber operations, that is, the
notion sometimes heard that cyberspace is such a new domain that no existing
law could – or even should – apply to military operations in it.
This is simply untrue. Most LOAC is not domain specific. Along this line
consider a recent project by the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and
Conflict Research to write a manual specifically on the international law
applicable to air and missile warfare.10 It did produce a useful volume, but it is
a relatively thin one as it was found that there was a comparatively modest
amount of law that could be said to be wholly unique to the air and space
domains. Much the same can be said about the cyber domain, to include
ethical considerations.11
Furthermore, what sometimes masquerades as a legal problem in cyber
operations is often more of a technical issue or a policy conundrum – not an
authentic legal problem. The much ballyhooed issue of what constitutes the
proverbial “act of war” in the cyber domain is a good example. Although the
phrase “act of war” is a political term, not a legal axiom, there are phrases like
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“use of force” and “armed attack” that do have legal meaning, and could relate
to a casus belli in terms of a forceful response.12
The interpretation of such expressions in the cyber realm is, in fact, resolvable
under the law, if – and, really, only “if” - technology can provide adequate data
as to, for example, the actual harm caused by the supposed “attack,” as well as
sufficient information as to who actually did it. Of course, the absence of
attribution data – which is technically so challenging to obtain in the cyber
realm - can be a definitive legal and ethical bar to a forceful response. This
may be frustrating when people want to “do something” in answer to a cyberincident, but it is hardly unreasonable for the law – and ethics - to require
reliable information as to who might be responsible before launching a counter
of some kind.
The fact that technologically-speaking, determining attribution is a daunting
task is not a problem for the lawyers or, for that matter, ethicists, but
something for technologists to solve. It is interesting therefore that the authors
of The Atlantic article referenced previously argue, in relation to the alleged use
of a cyber-weapon (Stuxnet) against Iran’s nuclear development facilities, that
“the lack of attribution of Stuxnet raises ethical concerns because it denied
Iran the ability to counterattack, encouraging it towards ever more extreme
behavior.”13
Aside from the question as to whether there would necessarily be a legal or
moral basis for Iran to counterattack as a result of the alleged Stuxnet
operation,14 it is of further interest that the authors of the Atlantic piece say
that “to make attribution work, we need international agreements.”15 These
would include, they contend, agreements that “cyberattacks should carry a
digital signature of the attacking organization” and that certain networking
protocols could be used to “make attribution easier.”16
While most experts would probably say that current law does not require such
facilitation of cyber attribution,17 the authors of the Atlantic article
nevertheless argue for “better on international network monitoring to trace
sources of attacks” and seem to believe that “[e]conomic incentives, such as the
threat of trade sanctions, can make such agreements desirable.” 18 Again,
there is much about these proposals with which one might disagree, but the
authors should be commended for at least beginning the dialogue as to how
one of the most perplexing legal and moral questions of cyberwar might be
addressed.
As with attribution, technological issues – not the law, per se – are also the
most challenging aspect of targeting of cyber-weaponry. The cardinal legal and
ethical principles of distinction and proportionality19 require technical data
that will inform decision-makers as to who might be affected by a particular
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technique, and to what extent. Again, that this may be technically hard-to-do
is not legal or ethical problem, but a scientific one. Indeed, it can be said that
one of the most needed capabilities in the world of cyber operations is the
ability to model effects with dependable accuracy, so as to provide decisionmakers - not to mention lawyers and ethicists - with the kind of information
that is patently essential for making reasoned judgments about employing a
cyber-methodology.

Do Legal and Ethical Values Unduly Encumber Cyberwarriors?
Over above questions about the application of legal regimes and ethical mores
to particular cyber scenario, is the broader question as to whether any
restraints should apply at all. More specifically, some believe that efforts to
apply the law will so encumber the U.S.’s cyber efforts that the nation’s
security is put at risk. This rather surprising question is at the heart of a
serious debate in which Stewart Baker and this writer engaged under the
auspices of the American Bar Association.20
Just by way of context, Mr. Baker is a highly-respected lawyer with the
prestigious Washington law firm of Steptoe & Johnson, and had previously
served in government as the general counsel of the National Security Agency,
as well as Assistant Secretary for Policy in the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. He begins his polemic is this way:
Lawyers don’t win wars. But can they lose a war? We’re likely to
find out, and soon. Lawyers across the government have raised so
many showstopping legal questions about cyberwar that they’ve
left our military unable to fight, or even plan for, a war in
cyberspace.21
Mr. Baker further claims that any attempts to “impose limits on cyberwar” and
are, in his opinion, “doomed.”22 Among the most troubling aspects of his
argument is really an ethical one of the first order in that he points to the
devastation caused by World War II air warfare and references former British
Prime minister Stanley Baldwin 1930s’ claim that in air warfare “the only
defense is in offence, which means that you have got to kill more women and
children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.”23
Mr. Baker then goes on to seem to endorse Mr. Baldwin’s “kill more women and
children more quickly” concept by asserting that if “we want to defend against
the horrors of cyberwar, we need first to face them, with the candor of a Stanley
Baldwin.”24 Only after constructing a cyberwar strategy so framed would Mr.
Baker consider it appropriate to “ask the lawyers” for their “thoughts.”25
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It is beyond the scope of this essay to fully reprise my response (though the
title - “Lawless Cyberwar? Not If You Want to Win.” – may be indicative of its
content), but suffice to say that it is vitally important in cyberwar (as with any
military operation) to ground the “limits” whenever possible not just in the law
or ethics, per se, but also in pragmatic, warfighting rationale. In the case of
cyber, this is not particularly difficult to do, especially if the actual warfighters
are not perceiving an asymmetry between what law and ethics might require,
and what they believe they need to accomplish their mission.
Notwithstanding Mr. Baker’s assertion that legal machinations have left the
armed forces “unable to fight, or even plan for, a war in cyberspace,” Air Force
General Robert Kehler, the commander of U.S Strategic Command whose
subordinate organization U.S. Cyber Command is the leading proponent of
military cyber planning and operations, seems to disagree, In November of
2011 he declared that he did “not believe that we need new explicit authorities
to conduct offensive operations of any kind.” 26 Furthermore, he said that that
he did “not think there is any issue about authority to conduct [cyber]
operations."27 In short, the warfighters apparently do not see an
incompatibility with legal and ethical restraints and their ability to effectively
“plan for a war in cyberspace.”
Adherence to the rule of law is especially important in the cyber realm because
nearly all experts agree that confronting the threat requires the cooperation of
foreign countries in order to track and neutralize cyber threats – in peace or
war.28 Nations vital to this effort, to include especially the world’s major
democracies, doubtlessly would not be inclined to cooperate with any country
that rejected limits on military operations, cyber or otherwise. Professors
Michael Riesman and Chris T. Antoniou point out in their 1994 book, The
Laws of War:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict
requires a substantial base of public support. That support can
erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the
political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted
in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.29
A dismissal of Mr. Baker’s construct for cyberwar is not to suggest, however,
that ethical and legal concerns about cyberwar are therefore obviated. For
example, one of the most serious concerns involves the role of civilians in cyber
operations.

Civilian Cyberwarriors
It almost goes without saying that enormous cyber expertise lies in the civilian
community, and it is essential that the armed forces have access to it. That
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said, the extent of that access, and precisely what that access does – or should
– mean, is properly the subject of legal and ethical scrutiny.
The basics are not hard. In order to enjoy the combatant privilege, that is a
“license” – so to speak - to engage in lawful destructive acts against the
enemy’s person or property without fear of prosecution, one must ordinarily be
a member of the duly constituted armed forces of a belligerent in an armed
conflict.30 This has often been misunderstood to mean that a civilian cannot
directly participate in hostilities. Actually, civilians can do so without
necessarily committing a war crime, but there are consequences.
Chief among them is the fact that if they fall into the hands of the enemy, they
might be properly subject to the enemy’s domestic criminal law for acts which,
if done by a member of the opposing military, would be privileged from
prosecution. What is more is that under the law of war, civilians are properly
targetable – kinetically or cyberly – when directly participating in hostilities. In
the cyber context, it should be understood that even the International
Committee of the Red Cross explicitly uses as examples of direct participation
acts that are the kind of things one would expect of a cyber-warrior, that is,
“Interfering electronically with military computer networks (computer network
attacks) and transmitting tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack.”31
What does all this mean from an ethical perspective? For one thing it is
essential that civilians understand the potential consequences, especially when
the civilian is away from the work site, such as at home with his or her family.
Although there is debate in the international community about what it takes
for a civilian to be targetable on the same basis as a member of the armed
forces, the International Committee of the Red Cross agrees that those civilians
who assume a “continuous combat function” (as opposed to merely
“participating in hostilities in a spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized way”)
can be targeted on a similar basis as members of the armed forces.32
Members of the armed forces – along with civilians regularly engaged in a “a
continuous combat function” such as computer network attack – can be
attacked with any legal weapon wherever and whenever found, regardless of
whether at that particular moment the individual presents an imminent threat
or is otherwise doing a military function. This means, for example, that a
civilian cyber-warrior regularly engaged in computer network attack operations
might be legitimately attacked by a lawful belligerent (not terrorists) in his
home in a Washington suburb. And not just with cyber weapons either; any
lawful weapon can be used if otherwise compliant with the law of war.
Accordingly, if the civilian is sufficiently critical to military cyber operations, he
or she could be assaulted with great violence wherever found, provided the
incidental death and injury to innocent civilians – like the cyber-warrior’s own
family – that might occur in the attack was not “excessive in relation to the
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concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (that “military advantage”
being, of course, the elimination or neutralization of the cyber expert).33
Thus, the ethical issue for cyber warriors may be the extent to which it is
appropriate to ask civilians to take these kinds of risks. It is one thing for
members of the armed forces who voluntarily undertake the proverbial
“unlimited liability contract” of military service to put themselves at risk; it is
quite another, however, to ask civilians to do so, and yet something further to
expect the families of civilians to accept that they may become collateral
damage in a conflict that has violent expressions along with nonkinetic, cyber
effects. In cyber war, the “front lines” may be far from what anyone might
recognize as the traditional battlefield.
It is impossible to know how real this kind of threat might be. However, in an
era of “sleeper cells” and the proliferation of other clandestine special
operations’ forces among many countries, this kind of counter to America’s
cyber capabilities may not be as outlandish as some might think. In any event,
this discussion of personal risk that cyber operations might occasion makes it
kind of ironic that cyber warriors need to steel themselves for a cruel assault
on their ethics and professionalism by some critics.

Challenges to the Martial Ethic of Cyber Warriors?
Perhaps one of the most perplexing critiques that have accompanied the
growing use of advanced technologies in war is the penchant among some
contemporary commentators to assume that it is somehow “unmanly” or
“unworthy” to employ them. Consider the experience of drone operators who,
like cyber combatants, wage war from computer consoles. A very recent article
by one pundit entitled “With its deadly drones, the US is fighting a coward's
war” is an example of the kind of nasty rhetoric that is used.34 Though such
aspersions have not yet been cast upon cyber-warriors, it seem like it is only a
matter of time before they will be subject to the same kind of insult to their
professional ethic.
How did all this start? It might be traceable to remarks a few years ago by Dr.
David Kilcullen, a retired Australian army lieutenant colonel who has become
one the foremost advocates of ground-centric, manpower-intensive form of
counterinsurgency that found expression in the Army and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Manual, (FM 3-24) published in 2006.35 It is important to
understand that the Manual is rather hostile to air operations in general, and
devotes just five pages to them in the 300-page document, so Dr. Kilcullen’s
critique of drones does not seem inconsistent with his broader views about
airpower.
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In any event, Dr. Kilcullen argued before Congress in 2009 that drone attacks
against terrorists were “backfiring.”36 “In the Pashtun tribal culture of honor
and revenge,” he said, “face-to-face combat is seen as brave; shooting people
with missiles from 20,000 feet is not.”37 According to Kilcullen, “using robots
from the air ... looks both cowardly and weak."38 Quite obviously, his thesis
might rather easily be applied to cyber operations and those who conduct
them.
What makes these statements stunning in their irony is that the adversary to
which Kilcullen refers not only use remotely detonated IEDs to kill US forces
from the safety of distance, but also employ children to plant them. Would
that not make them, by their own “culture of honor” standards, “cowardly and
weak”? Regardless, this entire discussion, however demoralizing and
inaccurate, is – in terms of actual warfighting - rather immaterial. The “object
of war”, as General Patton rather graphically put it, “is not to die for your
country but to make the other guy die for his.”
Physical courage, however admirable, is not the only quality one needs for
victory in 21st century warfare, and perhaps ever. Native Americans, for
example, waged war with extraordinary courage. In the April 2012 issue of the
Journal of Military History historian Anthony R. McGinnis points out that
Native Americans’ individualistic and stylized form of warfare was no match for
“a modern technologically advanced nation” with “ultimate victory as its
goal.”39 Of course, there is nothing wrong with being “a modern technologically
advanced nation” with “ultimate victory as its goal” so long as those
technological advances are used in a legally and ethically appropriate way.
The reality is that not only is there nothing unethical about waging war from
afar, there is actually nothing especially unusual about it. Since practically the
beginning of time, warriors have sought to engage their adversaries in ways
that denied their opponents the opportunity to bring their weapons to bear.
For example, as this writer has said elsewhere:
David slew Goliath with a missile weapon before the giant could
bring his weapons to bear; the sixteen-foot pikes of Alexander the
Great‘s phalanxes reached their targets well ahead of the twelve
foot pikes wielded by their opponents; English longbowmen
destroyed the flower of French knighthood at Agincourt from afar
when they rained arrows down upon the horsemen; and, more
recently, U.S. and British tanks destroyed the heart of Saddam‘s
armor forces during 1991‘s Battle of 73 Easting much because
their guns outranged those of Iraq‘s T-72 tanks. There is nothing
new about killing from a distance.40
Still, there is something about computerized warfare that draws special scorn
from some, however wrongly and unfairly. For example, Phillip Altson, a New
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York University law professor was commissioned by the United Nations as a
“Special Rapporteur” to write a report on targeted killings. The document he
produced also included his opinions about drone operators.41 In it he charged
that because drone operations can be conducted “entirely through computer
screens and remote audio feed, there is a risk, “ he says, “of developing a
‘PlayStation’ mentality to killing.”42
‘PlayStation’ mentality to killing? That even the suggestion of such an
insulting lack of professionalism would find itself into an official UN report is,
itself, disquieting. The principle evidence for Professor Alston’s finding appears
to be his own speculations about the mindset of those doing a task he has
never himself performed. The actual evidence, however, points in a very
different direction than the one Alston suggests, and one that reinforces the
idea that these officers hardly consider their duties a game. Indeed, Dr. Peter
Singer of the Brookings Institution said in 2010 that in his studies he found
“higher levels of combat stress among [some drone] units than among some
units in Afghanistan.”43 He concluded that operators suffered “significantly
increased fatigue, emotional exhaustion and burnout.”44 These maladies are
hardly indicative of “game” players.
More recently, the Air Force Times quoted an Air Force official who countered
the “video game” accusation directly by pointing out that the responsibilities of
drone operators were extremely stressful, and that the operations were “a
deeply, deeply emotional event. It’s not detached. It’s not a video game.”45
While debate still roils,46 it demonstrates how quickly some critics deride the
professionalism of principled people doing what their nation asks them to do.
Quite obviously, the comparison with the cyber operations is not quite the
same, but – regardless – cyber operators are in the very serious business of
defending their country and, in doing so, may be called upon to wreak havoc
via cyber methodologies upon an adversary. Though the means of doing so
may be different, the professionalism the operations demand is very high, and
the psychological burdens those who conduct them are likely very great.
Another aspect of the drone campaigns has emerged which might find analogy
in the ethics and professionalism that cyber operators must display. It is
expressed an April 29012 article in Rolling Stone by controversial writer
Michael). In it Hastings claims:
[T]he remote-control nature of unmanned missions enables…the
Pentagon and the CIA [to] now launch military strikes or order
assassinations without putting a single boot on the ground – and
without worrying about a public backlash over U.S. soldiers
coming home in body bags. The immediacy and secrecy of drones
make it easier than ever for leaders to unleash America's military
might – and harder than ever to evaluate the consequences of such
clandestine attacks.47
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For all his bluster, Hastings has something of a point when he says that “the
immediacy and secrecy of drones make it easier than ever for leaders to
unleash America's military might.” This writer’s experience has been that
senior decision-makers are keenly aware that any military operation can have
unintended consequences – no matter how ‘cost free’ it might seems in
planning. Still, what he says with respect to drones might find a parallel with
cyber operations, and could call upon cyber-warriors to exhibit ethical virtues,
including especially candor and courage.

The Need for Frank, Holistic Advice
The newness of cyber operations, the uncertainty of their precise effect, and the
sheer difficulty of their execution may not always be fully understood by all
participants in the chain of decision, and these conditions may give rise to
another ethical responsibility, and that is to render frank, holistic advice. It is
not impossible that in a given situation those involved in the process may have
to step out of their lane, so to speak, to ask the hard questions, or point out
inconvenient facts. If America’s cyber power is to be “unleashed” as Hastings
might put it, it is imperative that it be done so with the same care as would be
the case with any more traditional military operation. To underline, this may
call upon someone to go beyond the norm, just to make sure that all the right
considerations are taken into account – to include ethical and legal ones – so
that the best decisions are made.
Fortunately, for lawyers anyway, the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Conduct - the ethical “bible” for lawyers - specifically allows such
holistic advice. Rrule 2.1 of the Code calls upon lawyers to “exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”48 Furthermore,
lawyers are not limited to providing legal advice as the Rule goes on to say that
in “rendering advice a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may
be relevant to the client’s situation.”49 In truth, this is the right guidance not
just for lawyers, but – really – for all military and civilian professionals engaged
in cyber operations because there success depends upon a wide range of
factors, and it is incumbent upon all involved to work together to ensure they
are surfaced and considered.
The rule mentions candor. Again, this not something simply for attorneys, but
is a fundamental ethical virtue for all defense professionals.50 Among other
things, it is an important trait to keep in mind when assessing the potential
threat that cyber represents. Misstating or, worse, deliberately
misrepresenting the threat, can lead to poor allocations of resources and other
errors in judgment. Opinions about the scope and nature of the threat differ
widely; in a PBS Newshour interview in the spring of 2012 Terry Benzel of the
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Information Research Institute insists that “all of us in [the cyber] community,
we talk about cyber-Pearl Harbor. And it's not if. It's when.”51 Likewise, a
“leading European cybersecurity expert says international action is needed to
prevent a catastrophic cyberwar and cyberterrorism.”52
Not all agree, however. In April of 2012 Rear Admiral Samuel Cox, director of
intelligence at the U.S. Cyber Command, was reported as having “played down
the prospect that an enemy of the U.S. could disable the nation's electric power
grid or shut down the Internet, saying those systems are designed to withstand
severe cyberattacks.”53 More stinging is a February 2012 Wired, article in
which researchers Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins debunk much of the histrionic
talk about the threat of cyberwar.54 According to Brito and Watkins, “evidence
to sustain such dire warnings [about cyberwar] is conspicuously absent.”55
Consistent with Brito and Watkins’ conclusions is a 2011 report by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.56 While asserting
that governments “need to make detailed preparations to withstand and
recover from a wide range of unwanted cyber events, both accidental and
deliberate,”57 the authors of that study nevertheless conclude “that very few
single cyber-related events have the capacity to cause a global shock.”58
Writing in Foreign Policy analyst Thomas Rid contends that cyberwar is “still
more hype than hazard.”59
All of this raises concerns because Brito and Watkins say that “[i]n many
respects, rhetoric about cyber catastrophe resemble the threat inflation we saw
in the run-up to the Iraq War.”60 They also point out that “[c]ybersecurity is a
big and booming industry” and that “Washington teems with people who have a
vested interest in conflating and inflating threats to our digital security.”61
Although they stop short of actually accusing anyone of pushing cyberwar fears
for personal gain, they do call for a “stop” in the “apocalyptic rhetoric” and
insist that “alarmist scenarios dominating policy discourse may be good for the
cybersecurity-industrial complex, but they aren’t doing real security any
favors.”62
The scope and immediacy of the threat is rightly debated, yet all might agree
that, in any case, deliberately overstating (or understating) the threat, even for
the well-intentioned reasons of advocacy, can raise questions of ethics and
professionalism. As Brito and Watkins suggest, in considering the run-up to
the war with Iraq in 2003 it is clear what can happen when a threat is
misconstrued, which may be why they entitle their polemic “Cyberwar Is the
New Yellowcake.” In short, candor – and tempered rhetoric if appropriate – are
critical qualities for cyberwarriors. President Obama’s measured language
which urges people to take the cyber threat “seriously” and to make planning
for it a “priority,” represents a responsible approach that highlights the dangers
without falling victim to counterproductive and misleading hyping.63
11

The Virtue of Competence
Finally, one of the key ethical responsibilities of cyber-warriors is competence.
Again, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides guidance that all cyber professionals may want to consider analogizing
to their responsibilities. Rule 1.1 of that Code says “[c]ompetent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”64 For those concerned about the legal and
ethical aspects of cyberwar, the ethic mandate for competence goes well beyond
knowledge and understanding of law and/or ethics, per se.
There is no doubt that there are many aspects of cyber operations that are
extraordinarily complex. Thus, it is incumbent upon legal - and other advisors
- to become as familiar as possible with the cyber client’s “business,” to include
its technical aspects. Not only will a working knowledge of the technology help
advisors to understand the facts sufficiently enough to apply legal and ethical
principles to them; it will also give such advisors all-important credibility with
those who seek their counsel in the first place. Decision-makers in the cyber
realm – like those seeking counsel in other activities – naturally will gravitate
towards those who show a genuine understanding of the many intricacies of
their discipline.
This is not an easy task. Staying current with the technology in this
phenomenally complicated field is a time-consuming and never ending job.
But it is one that must be undertaken well in advance of need, as failing to do
so may lead to a lifetime of regret. Winston Churchill once observed:
To every man there comes in his lifetime that special moment when
he is figuratively tapped on the shoulder and offered a chance to do
a very special thing, unique to him and fitted to his talents. What
a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified for
the work which would be his finest hour.65

Concluding Observations
This essay has sought to illustrate just a few of the examples of how law and
ethics might intersect. This effort may invite the question: which of these
imperatives will best operate to impose the limits on cyberwar that honorable –
yet pragmatic – people demand? Kenneth Anderson, a professor of law at
American University, recently had occasion to consider one of his earlier
writings about the efficacy of law and honor as “engines” for right behavior in
conflict. Professor Anderson maintains:
Faith in legality as the engine driving such adherence as exists to
the laws of war seems to me, however, entirely misplaced; it is a
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fantasy tailor-made for lawyers, and especially for American
lawyers. Lawyers believe the problem is one of enforcement,
whereas in fact it is one of allegiance. Codifications of
international law are a useful template for organizing the
categories of a soldier’s duties. But, in the end, the culture
relevant to respect for international humanitarian law is not the
culture of legality and the cult of lawyers, but instead it is the
culture of the professional honour of soldiers, and what they are
willing or not willing to do on the battlefield.66
Whether “honor” is conterminous with ethics, or a subset of the same, may be
appropriate for a lively university debate. What is more important to note
however, as Anderson does, is that the John Keegan, perhaps the most
eminent military historian of the modern era, had no reservations in saying
that there “is no substitute for honour as a medium for enforcing decency on
the battlefield, never has been, and never will be.”
The cyber “battlefields” may not much resemble the ones to which Keegan
refers, but his view certainly has equal applicability. In the end, honor and the
ethical mindset it implies, is indispensable. Yet the discussion cannot end
there, because merely having developing the character to come to know the
right answer is not enough, as it may take courage to insist upon it.
The courage that cyber warriors need is not necessarily the physical courage
that traditional battlefield combatants are called upon to display. Rather, it is
vastly more likely that cyber combatants will need to exhibit moral courage.
This is especially so as norms are developed for the conduct of cyber
operations. Doing the right thing, particularly in circumstances of extreme
urgency where there is no explicit guidance save for reference to classic tenets
of law and ethics, may be quite a challenge.
Cyber combatants may wish to consider that in his classic study of military
heroism another British historian, Max Hastings, concludes that “physical
bravery is found [in the military] more often than the spiritual variety.” 67
“Moral courage,” he insists “is rare.”68 Yet it is exactly this kind of rare that
cyber warriors most need to exhibit. The law can provide an architecture, but
it is only when honor and moral courage intersect can we truly be assured that
ethical principles worth defending are actually preserved.
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